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that the existence of another adequate remedy will not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief.68 The result is,
therefore, that not only does the Court depart from the
weight of authority elsewhere, but also it ignores an attempted codification of that authority into the Act by the
Maryland Legislature. It is submitted that where the
legislative intent is so strongly averred, it should not be
so lightly dismissed.
The legislature could, as has been done in the past,69
repeal and re-enact the statute, including therein a preamble which would leave no doubt as to the correct interpretation of the Act. It is also possible that the Court
could adopt a rule of reason whereby a plaintiff would only
be denied relief if it reasonably appeared that his rights
would be better served in an ordinary action in law or
equity.
The view in the Caroline case can and should be
changed. If it is not, Maryland citizens will be forced to
continue using antagonistic and quarrelsome remedies, instead of employing a peaceful and amicable method of procedure, better adapted to the purposes of justice. It is possible that the benefits sought under the Act will be bestowed upon the people of Maryland in some way not suggested here. This, however, is of little significance. The
important end to be attained is to see that ultimately the
beneficial progress and practical usefulness of the Act is
restored to Maryland procedure.
POWER TO MODIFY OVERDUE INSTALLMENTS
OF ALIMONY
Winkel v. Winkel'
The wife instituted suit for separate maintenance or
alimony. The trial court awarded her a set weekly amount
until further order of the court, beginning from the time
that the wife should convey certain property to the husband. The conveyance was not obtained until several years
later, and the husband made no payments during that
time. Subsequent to this, the husband did not pay the
weekly amounts but did pay the wife a weekly rental for
the use of certain of her property, which rental was in
68 Supra, n. 2, 59.

69 Md. Code (1939) Art. 9, See. 33. See the preamble and declaration of
Legislative intent as found thereunder.
1 178 Md. 489, 15 A. (2d) 914 (1940).
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excess of the alimony payments. When this rental arrangement came to an end the wife filed a petition for
an increase in the amount of her award. After protracted
litigation, the original petition in the present case was
filed by the wife, on October 5, 1937, for an increase in
alimony, and also for the arrears due her through her
husband's default. The husband's answer and demurrer
were overruled.' The Chancellor in his decree reduced
the amount of alimony as of October 5, 1937 (the date of
the original petition), and computed the amount of arrears
due the wife from the time of the conveyance of the property mentioned in the original decree to the date of the
filing of the petition in question. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the order of the Chancellor in lowering the
amount of the award, and reduced the amount of past-due
installments to exclude the period of time during which
the rental payments were being made.
In the instant case the Court was faced with the problem of modification of installments of alimony which were
in arrears and which had accrued during a period prior
to the time of the filing of the petition by the wife. This
is a problem that had not been directly faced or ruled on
before by the Maryland Court. The two conflicting theories
to be balanced are the protection of the finality of the
wife's decree; and the possible protection afforded the husband, when financially unhealthy, from a rapacious wife.
The reason for reducing the amount of the award of
past-due installments was, as stated by the Court, that
during the interim period between the date when the
alimony first became due, upon the conveyance of the
property by the wife (which was a condition precedent
to the effectiveness of the decree), and the cessation of
the rental arrangement, the husband was paying a rental
which was not proportionate to the value of the property,
and which was over twice the amount of the alimony
award. Although it was not paid as alimony, the wife,
in suing for an increase in alimony on cessation of these
payments, made no mention of a claim for this apparent
arrearage in alimony. This seemed to indicate that the
wife had waived payment of the then accrued installments,
or had accepted the rent in lieu of them.
The decree as actually handed down seems to be in
accord with the past decisions of the Court. The result
2 This ruling was affirmed on the earlier appeal of this case, 176 Md. 167,
4 A. (2d) 128 (1939).
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was only to modify installments not technically overdue;
only installments due from the time of the filing of the
petition were modified. This was done because the decree
expressly stated that the amounts were payable "pending
further order of the Court", and the wife, by filing her
petition, put the matter back into the hands of the Court,
which, after its consideration, can make its modification
effective at any time after the date of the petition. This
was really not a question of modifying past-due installments, but a question of when the decree of the Court
should take effect-retroactively from the beginning of
the litigation or the filing of the petition, or from the time
of handing down of the final order. In deciding that the
Chancellor could make his order effective as of the time
of the filing of the petition the Court would seem to have
ample authority in Maryland (and elsewhere). However,
before making these alterations in the order of the Chancellor, the Court went thoroughly into the question of a
flat modification of the past-due installments of alimony,
those due prior to the time of the filing of the petition by
the wife. On this point the Court stated that, in conformity with previous Maryland cases and in line with
Maryland domestic law, past-due installments were subject to modification, that is capable of being decreased and
rescinded. It further stated that there was no law contrary
to this in Maryland and that such would have been done
in the present case had not the husband shown that he did
not deserve such special treatment by the Court, as he was
in arrears not because of unfortunate financial circumstances but because of his own contumacy. Thus, on the
basis of Skirven v. Skirven, the Court refused to accord
him this special treatment and left the overdue alimony unmodified, although it asserted the power to do so in a
proper case.
The Court, in reaching this rather new conclusion, cited
numerous cases, but seemed to base its conclusion mainly
on the Braecklein case,4 the Clarke case,5 the second Marshall case8 and a few others.
3 Skirven v. Skirven, 154 Md. 267, 140 A. 205 (1928).
4 Braecklein v. Braecklein, 136 Md. 32, 109 A. 546 (1920).
5 Clarke v. Clarke, 149 Md. 590, 131 A. 821 (1925).
6 Marshall v. Marshall, 164 Md. 107, 163 A. 874 (1932). The other (first)
Marshall case, Marshall v. Marshall, 162 Md. 116, 59 A. 269 (1932), involved the question whether, after awarding a wife an a vinoulo divorce
without any order for alimony, the court could later modify the decree by
ordering alimony to be paid.
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The main pillar of the theory of the law pronounced
is the Marshall case. 7 In this case the parties entered into
an agreement, which was incorporated into the decree,
that the husband pay the wife a certain sum until her
death or remarriage, and in event of either, then to the
children until their death or marriage. After several years
the husband ceased payments because of financial inability,
but he later came into more money and the wife obtained
an order for the arrears. The Chancellor then rescinded
this order and disallowed the wife's claim for the payments
in arrears and relieved the husband of liability to pay
temporarily. On appeal the Court of Appeals reversed
this order of the Chancellor, the reversal being based on
the ground that the payments in this case were not "true"
alimony, not being of such nature as to answer to the
definition of alimony in Maryland. However the Court,
in citing this case in the Winkel opinion, interprets this
reversal of the order of the Chancellor because not "true"
alimony as being an approval in general by the Court
of the attempt of the Chancellor to modify past-due installments. The Court states it to be the "negative form"
of this action. It would seem odd that precedent should
be found in a reversed lower court case, merely because
the reversal was not on the particular point, when the
same point was not brought up in that appeal. It is to be
noted that the amount of the award in the Marshall case
included maintenance for children. Thus, as to the entire
amount, the defect of not being true alimony would be
involved, whereas the question as to modification of pastdue installments of alimony would cover only that portion
of it which was to be treated by the parties as alimony.
It is a long jump to say that the Court, by holding that
the Chancellor could not modify past-due installments of
contract alimony and maintenance, does hold that the
Chancellor can modify past-due installments of true
alimony.
8 cited by the Court
The case of Fairbanksv. Fairbanks,
as the present method of suspending payments past-due,
and as bringing out the point that if the Court can suspend
installments it can alter them, does not support the instant
decision. There the Chancellor did hold the arrears "in
abeyance" but, as was stated,9 the husband was with7 Marshall v. Marshall. 164 Md. 107, 163 A. 874 (1932).

Fairbanks v. Fairbanks, 169 Md. 212, 181 A. 233 (1935).
'Fairbanks v. Fairbanks, 169 Md. 212, 220-221, 181 A. 233 (1935).
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out property and the wife's only present remedy was
to have the husband up for contempt and the order did
not preclude the wife from filing such a petition. An
alteration or flat modification of the amount due, by the
Court, would have precluded her from recovering these
amounts at any future time.
The Court cites the Braecklein case ° as further authority for the power to modify, by rescission or reduction,
an alimony decree, even after enrollment and with no
express reservation contained in the decree. In that case
the lower court entered a decree for the wife allowing her
$18 weekly, but the husband was to be credited for such
sums as the wife received from certain joint property.
Later, after the enrollment of this decree, the lower court
ordered that that part pertaining to the payment of alimony be rescinded and vacated. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the power of an equity court to modify "that part
of a decree providing for alimony, whether the decree
grants a divorce a mensa or a vinculo". But the Court
noted that the alimony granted was half of the alleged
income from the joint property and presumed that the
award had been incorporated to assure the obtention of
this amount by the wife, and to keep the matter under
the control of the Court until the exact income could be
determined. It then remarked that probably the Court
rescinded the order to prevent the wife from receiving
over half of the income if the amounts decreased. However, it remanded the case to give opportunity to find if
such presumptions were true. This is probably the one
case that gets close to supporting the stand of the Court
in the instant case, because a conditional approval was
there given to the rescission of an alimony decree. But
the Court, in considering this case did not treat the decree
vacated as one of "true" alimony, but really one based on
the division of property, with a decree directed at the
husband so that this division could be effectuated more
readily. In any other set of facts the result could not
stand up. Were it not based on obligations already legally
enforceable and which continued after the rescission,
would it not cause the wife to be indebted to the husband
for payments already made? Certainly the Court would
not alter any decree to a degree that entered into the
minus category, and which would overstep any of the reasoning favoring alterations by the courts. Obviously this
10Braecklein v. Braecklein, 136 Md. 32, 109 A. 546 (1920).
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decision can only be cited as authority, if at all, as the
case was remanded, for the same peculiar facts as it had.
The Clarke case" was also quoted at length in the instant case as to the power of the equity courts to exercise
a continuing jurisdiction over alimony, with the power
to increase or decrease. This case is merely a short case
overruling the lower court in sustaining a demurrer to
the petition of the wife asking that alimony be granted.
Here the divorce was a mensa and alimony had been refused in the original decree. This decision reaffirmed the
continuing jurisdiction of the courts in an a mensa case
whether or not alimony had been granted. But there was
not a hint of possible retroactive effect in the decree.
As a heading for a review of the cases as to this point
the Court states the conclusion written by Judge Offutt
in the Knabe case to be the conclusion reached by this
Court: 12
"So the law of this State now is that where alimony
is allowed in a decree awarding a divorce a mensa or
a vinculo, or in a decree awarding alimony alone, the
jurisdiction of the court as to alimony is continuing,
whether reserved or not, and so much of the decree
as relates to the allowance of alimony may be from
time to time changed and the allowance increased or
decreased, or otherwise modified, so as to conform to
the changed conditions."
A long line of cases is cited as approving. There can
be no doubt that this is the law of Maryland and that it
was correctly applied in the Knabe case-where it was
referring to future alimony. But it is not authority for
any order to modify past due installments. The language
is obviously only intended to apply to future installments.
What would be the purpose of stating that past due installments can be increased? What would be the purpose
of increasing them? Obviously were such considered
seriously, where changed conditions are such that an increase in alimony is desired and needed, a party asking for
an increase in past-due installments would be admitting
laches and basing the request thereon. However, such
statements as the above can not be claimed to be any
authority for the present question, they were made with11 149 Md. 590, 131 A. 821 (1925).
12 Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 606, 616, 6 A. (2d) 366 (1939) ; noted (1939)
3 Md, L. Rev. 367.
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out any thought of such question arising-and in all probability with the idea that Maryland had followed the general rule as to this matter.
The Court states that "No decisions have been found
to be in conflict with the views here expressed." Yet close
reading of the decision in Kalben v. King," which this
Court has cited on the rule as to limitations, and also as
.flatly advocating that a one year limit be applied, will
show a dictum rather contrary to the result reached in
this case. There the refusal of the Chancellor to allow
the wife to collect 8 years of accrued past due installments
was because these arose from alimony pendente lite and
the wife had been guilty of laches. Further, it was proved
that the wife had abandoned the suit and now had come
in at the death of the husband to claim against the estate.
The Court properly found the Chancellor was correct and
made this statement: 4
"In a pending suit reasonable limitation would be
the rule of the ecclesiastical courts, which limited the
period for the recovery of arrears of alimony to one
year. This rule, however, would be applied only to
pending suits, as a final decree carries with it the
right to recover arrearsfor twelve years."
This would seem to mean that the Court in that case
thought that as to arrears from a final decree, as distinguished from alimony pendente lite, the wife had a right
to recover them during the limitation period, that whether
or not it be called a "duty" and not a debt, nevertheless
the right to collect them should stand for the full period
of limitations with the full indicia of the lasting and irrevocable debt of record.
Further, in the Winkel case, the Court dismisses the
Rosenberg case'- as having no application and as merely
holding that under the rule for full faith and credit to be
given to a foreign decree the Court could not presume
the decree to be revocable and non-final. In that case the
question concerned collecting past-due installments on a
decree entered by a Virginia court. The Maryland Court
allowed this to be done, presuming the Virginia decree
to be final. However, there was no Virginia law proved
in the Rosenberg case. The Judicial Notice statute was
Kalben v. King, 166 Md. 632, 172 A- 80 (1934).
14166 Md. 632, 63940, 172 A. 80, 83 (1934).
Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Md. 49, 135 A. 840 (1927).
13
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not yet in force, 16 and the Court, in making its presumption
of foreign law, would not presume a law different from
the domestic law. Obviously, the Court was presuming
similar law and was applying Maryland law as it saw
it. Had the Court thought that decrees were modifiable
in Maryland as to unpaid past due installments, it would
not go out of its way to presume a different law elsewhere.
It cannot be said that it would be required to by the full
faith and credit clause, because that only requires that
the same degree of credit be given a foreign decree as
would be given to it in its own state. If the forum's own
decrees were not final it would not be obliged to presume
the foreign decree to be final (and normally would not
so presume) and so entitled to greater enforcement than
its own. The Court stated: 17
"The finality of the decree as of right of the plaintiff to payments fully matured under its provisions
must be presumed where there is no proof of Virginia
law to the contrary. The obligation to give full faith
and credit to the decree sued on does not permit the
assumption that the right which it declared and
secured was subject to an unexpressed and unproved
power of revocation."
The main authority relied on in the Rosenberg case
was Sistare v. Sistare, s which had held that Connecticut
had to give effect to an alimony decree of another State
so as to allow recovery of the unpaid installments, overriding the local interpretation of the New York law on
the power of the New York courts to modify as to these
unpaid installments, and stating that such should never
be assumed by the Court unless express authority was
given for doing so. The Supreme Court, in reference to
the full faith and credit to be given, held that the determining factor was whether the state of issuance of the
decree gave it final effect, or whether in that state it was
subject to modification as to past due installments.
This examination into cases from which the Court has
found its precedents has not been solely with the purpose
of attacking the logic of the Court, nor to point out any
possible errors in interpretation of these cases which the
10 After the passage of the Judicial Notice act, Md. Code (1939) Art. 35,
Secs. 56-62, the question as to the presumption of foreign law has become
moot.
27 Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Md. 49, 52, 135 A. 840 (1927).
18 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. 1 (1910).
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Court may have indulged in. It has been to show that
from a careful examination of past cases in point in Maryland, it is very possible to arrive at the opposite conclusion
from that arrived at by the Court, that the final decision
as to the law on this point is really being made for the
first time as an outright statement of law in this case (and
if anything, it is being made contrary to the existing authority of the Rosenberg case). And, it is felt that the
Court in making this statement is really finally settling
or possibly changing a point on which there has been no
direct holding, and in so doing it should have been guided,
not only by possible nuances found in past cases or in presentations on the law as found in the briefs of the interested counsel, but also by the effect such decision will
have on the domestic law of Maryland.
Whether or not the Court has correctly interpreted the
law, there can be no doubt that from some angles the
result does not appear too desirable. Further, the Court,
after making an affirmative holding on the law, then decided that it should not be applied in the present case
because of the "dirty hands" of the cross-petitioner. It
would seem that as there was no need for the Court to
be so forthright and positive in stating the law, that the
Court might possibly have been humble enough to leave
it to be decided at a later time when it was found to be
definitely necessary; and then only after further and full
argument was had again on this very point. Certainly
there would seem to be no great rush to put Maryland in
a position where its law is declared to be contrary to that
of the majority of the other states, and to the decision of
the Supreme Court of the United States. 9
The full results of this decision are not yet determinable, but an important and obvious question is the position
of the wife if the husband moves into another jurisdiction.
As the judgment is not final, full faith and credit requirements do not cloak it as of right. It might voluntarily
be recognized,2 0 but it is doubtful that many states would
so act, for the foreign states would then be giving more
effect to the Maryland judgment than the forum state did.
Probably most states would refuse to allow a suit based
on an alimony decree from Maryland as a debt of record. 21
Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (1901).
Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, 190 N. W. 542 (1922).
This case, Holton v. Holton, cited in the preceding note, is cited as
deciding that Minnesota will recognize the decree of a foreign state even
if such is modifiable. But the court in its decision quotes several cases
20
21
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In this place the result from the Staub case 22 might be
considered. By that case if the wife gets a divorce out of
the state with no alimony, she can not get alimony in
Maryland later, as the status on which the jurisdiction
rests to give alimony is gone. Inversely then, would Maryland recognize alimony granted out of state to accompany
a divorce granted in Maryland? Seemingly not. So, to
get a decree enforceable in Maryland and also out of the
state, the wife would be compelled to get her divorce in
another jurisdiction, on the basis of residence recognized
by Maryland, with alimony granted there, and then bring
the decree into this State and get it enforced.
The ultimate result aimed at by the decision in the
Winkel case is good, the protection of the husband from
the past claims of the wife when his financial situation
is such that payment is impossible, and the accumulation
of past-due installments creates a financial embarrassment
to him. In most instances the case of the wife has the
aroma of laches around it, as deliberate delay many times
is involved. But it would seem that a desirable result
could be reached in other ways without the resultant
nullifying of the foreign effect of alimony decrees. The
use of the doctrine of laches to invalidate claims that cover
a long period where the delay is the wife's fault, has been
efficacious. It was used early in domestic law. The De
Blasquire case2 3 is an excellent example of this and is no
authority for the decision in this case, though it was cited
as such. Another example is Kalben v. King," discussed
earlier, applying laches to pendente lite alimony. Another
method was shown in the Fairbanks case. 25 Upon proper
cause shown, the Court could hold the past due arrears
in abeyance and treat the future payments in whatever
way desirable.
from other jurisdictions, all to the effect that the power to modify alimony
decrees as to past-due installments is not to be interpreted as given to any
court in the absence of a direct and uncontrovertible statute. Its conclusion was that the foreign decree (Oregon decree) would be recognized
even if it were modifiable, until the filing of a petition for modification.
The summary of the law as discussed by this court on the point of modification, with citations to recent cases based on the supreme court decision
mentioned above, Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (1901), show the overwhelming strength of the cases against modification. As to the statement
that the power to modify as to past-due installments should not be presumed in a court in the absence of express statute, it is obvious that there
is no such statute in Maryland.
22 Staub v. Staub, 170 Md. 202, 183 A. 605
(1936).
28 De Blasquire v. De Blasquire, 3 Hagg. Ecc. 322, 162 Eng. Repr. 1173
(1830).
24 Kalben v. King, 166 Md. 632, 172 A. 80 (1934).
26 Fairbanks v. Fairbanks, 169 Md. 212, 181 A. 233 (1935).
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This would seem to reach a desirable result. If the
wife can show that conditions have changed and the husband is capable of paying those amounts, and the actions
of the wife warrant such payment, then such debts could
again be allowed. (In the cited case the Court stated that
the wife could at any time have the husband up for contempt, unless he could show the financial inability which
was alleged by him. It probably would be better if the
'in abeyance' decree were more controlling.) This treatment would keep the entire matter within the conscience
of the Court, with an elastic standard, but with the outside effect of finality. The decree would not be modifiable
as to past amounts, the Court merely would not recognize
the right of the wife to get beneficial effect from the decree, i. e., would not hold the husband in contempt.
In conclusion, it might be suggested that, in view of the
effect of this decision and of the fact that the law announced was not really necessary, nor was it applied, but
was actually dictum, the Court in considering future cases
on this point can, without any earthshaking results, ignore
and override this decision by following the interpretation
indicated in such earlier and sounder cases as Rosenberg
v. Rosenberg and Kalben v. King.
RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR-THE EFFECT OF
DEVIATION ON THE "SCOPE OF
EMPLOYMENT"
A. S. A bell Co. v. Sopher 1
Defendant appealed from a judgment of the trial court
holding it liable for the negligence of its servant. The
testimony was uncontradicted, and the defendant-appellant contends that the trial court should have ruled as a
matter of law that it was not liable. The evidence established that the employee of defendant set out from defendant's place of business, driving defendant's truck, to
deliver proof to various customers. He delivered proof to
some of the assigned places, the last of which was in the
2100 block of West Lafayette Street. From that point he
proceeded to Gwynn Oak Junction, a distance of about
fifteen blocks (approximately' 2/2 miles), where he picked
up a package which he intended to deliver to his mother
who lived at 3806 Granada Avenue. On his way to his
122 A. (2d) 462 (Md., 1941).

